
R E M A R K S

ON

MR. PAINE'S PAMPHLET,

CALLED

THE RIGHTS OF MAN.

1609/2636.



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ON
MR. PAINE'S PAMPHLET,
CALLED
THE RIGHTS OF MAN.
IN A
LETTER TO A FRIEND.

THE POPE WOULD OF OUR CHURCH BEREAVE US;
BUT STILL OUR MONARCH HE WOULD LEAVE US.
BUT FOR THAT DAMN'D FANATIC CREW;
THEY'D PULL DOWN CHURCH, AND MONARCH, TOO!

D U B L I N:
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M,DCC,XCI.



INTRODUCTION.

THE following Advertisement appeared in most of the news-papers, shortly after the publication of Mr. Paine's pamphlet.

WHIGS OF THE CAPITAL.

AT a numerous Meeting of the WHIGS OF THE CAPITAL, at the Eagle in Euface-street, on Tuesday the 5th of April, 1791.

HUGH CROTHERS, Esq; in the CHAIR,

Resolved unanimously, That a Committee (with the President and Secretary) be now appointed, to consider of the most effectual mode of disseminating Mr. PAINE'S Pamphlet on the Rights of Man, in reply to Mr. BURKE'S Reflections on the French Revolution.

And the following members were accordingly appointed to compose the said committee, viz.—
Messrs. Hugh Crothers, &c. &c. &c. &c.

Resolved, That the several members of the said Committee, be, and they are hereby impowered to receive subscriptions, to enable them to carry the said resolution into effect.

Signed by order,

J. CHAMBERS, Sec.

I know not for what purpose these men have assumed the name of WHIG.—Possibly they did so, in hopes of being confounded with that respectable body, the WHIG CLUB of Ireland.—I am sorry they have so far succeeded, that it will be necessary to inform some of my readers, that these two Clubs differ materially both in rank and principles.



REMARKS.

REMARKS, &c.

MY DEAR SIR,

THE popularity and propagation of Mr. Paine's pamphlet in Ireland, at first surpris'd me much.—I found it difficult to account for, by any interest which I could suppose the people of this country to take in the event of the French revolution.—Men of sanguine temper often form violent opinions on the most speculative points, and enter with much warmth into the agitation of questions, in the matter of which they are very little concerned ; but when men embrace, defend and disseminate the principles of a book, in the subject of which they are not interested, with a zeal, which, supposing them to be so, would be extraordinary, it is natural to look for some other motives for their conduct :—whether the late proceedings in France are justifiable or not—whether Mr. Burke's or Mr. Paine's opinions on that event are right ;—whether according to the one, the National Assembly is a synod of political saints ; or, according to the
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the other, a bloody and ferocious democracy, are questions the importance of which to the gentlemen who stile themselves Whigs of the Capital, I shall not presume to determine: but it appears to me that the persons for whose edification they have subscribed towards a dissemination of Mr. Paine's pamphlet, are very little interested in any of these disquisitions, and when these gentlemen obtrude upon the public their approbation of this book, and volunteer a subscription to distribute its contents, at a price within the purchase of the husbandman and the mechanic, I cannot attribute their conduct to the good wishes alone which they may feel for the success of France, in the subversion of its government. I think I can trace it to a higher cause, and shew that the magnitude of the end is proportioned to the industry of the means.

There is in this country, a description of men, whose principles in politics are republican, and in religion presbyterian, enemies to monarchy in the government, and establishment in the church.— To this body a plausible dilation of their favorite tenets must have been particularly acceptable, and to their ears the bolder tone in which Mr. Paine has sounded the trumpet of innovation, could not but be grateful. In a conviction of this, I find my mind amply satisfied as to the motives of dispersing over the country six-penny packets of sedition, for the study of a common people, but lately and scarcely emerging from the darkness of ignorance.



norance.—A panegyric upon innovation, a ridicule of establishments, a justification of rebellion, a libel upon the government and religion of their country, are good materials to form a grammar for their infant information, and disinterested instructors have thrown it almost gratuitously into their hands.

I shall make no remark on those passages in the book which relate to the circumstances of the French Revolution. The French Revolution was the pretext and not the motive of its publication.—I shall confine my observations to what appears to me treasonous against the constitution and established religion of England.

Exclusive of his opinions of the French revolution, the substance of the pamphlet is reducible to three propositions.

1st. That by the inherent rights of man, the people in any country is impowered to give itself a constitution and reform its government.

2dly. That England has no constitution, and requires a reform from the people.

3dly. That monarchy, episcopacy, peerage, and hereditary honours, &c. &c. are among the grievances which should be abolished.

I do

I do not state the proof of those propositions, to have been the professed purport of the book, but they are all, in different parts of it, warmly supported. To these sentiments the pamphlet is indebted for the notice I at present take of it, and possibly they were not entirely overlooked by the Whigs of the Capital, when they subscribed to a fund for propagating its tenets.

The first of these propositions is of a nature so refined and abstracted, that I shall only consider it as far as it is intended to be the foundation of the other two, and shall be satisfied, if I can shew that the utmost which can be proved from it, will not justify the inference of those.

I hold it false in reasoning, and pernicious in consequences, to apply to politics, whose object is the well ordering of mankind in a state of society, those first principles calculated for man in a state of nature, if such a state ever existed. Their metaphysical truth is not to be denied, but their practical application I will not admit. To their metaphysical truth it is certain that at all times every opinion and maxim in politics must ultimately, thro' the medium of a qualifying deduction, be referred; but it does not follow from this admission, that in the present advanced state of things, in the maturity, not to say the old age of the world, the affairs of mankind are on every occasion to be regulated by an immediate and short reference

reference to those first principles, whose full extent is only applicable to its infancy, and whose application becomes every day more remote. From Mr. Paine's manner of putting his argument, one would suppose that by refusing his conclusion, you deny that man has any rights; this he betrays by his question, *Will Mr. Burke say that man has no rights?** There is no sophism more common or more successful than this, of laying down a position which you cannot or do not wish to deny, and drawing an illegitimate conclusion, which by a false dilemma offers you the alternative of abandoning the axiom or admitting the inference. This will be defeated by distinguishing between natural and political rights, and by a retrospect to the formation of society.

Let us suppose (and no supposition is unfair when we argue on first principles) an assemblage of men meeting for the first time with each other, it matters not by what accident; suppose them according to the doctrine of metaphysicians, becoming sensible of the dangers, difficulties, and inconveniences of living independent of each other, and forming themselves formally into society by unanimous compact.—In this situation, every individual of this number, be it never so great, would possess in his own person the natural equality, and the fullest rights of man—each exerting those rights

* Rights of Man, Page 25.

on the title of that equality ; all would produce a community by which all would be benefited and all would be bound.—Here obligation would begin, and independence would end ; as the relation of obligation implies a superior, the equality of man would abate, and the rights of which it is the essence would proportionably retire with it. Thus in that primary origin of society, to which Mr. Paine is so anxious to refer every thing, those original rights of man, which he supposes to be in their full force at this day, must have necessarily abated of their plenitude in the very first moment of their exercise:—I say these rights must have abated of their plenitude in the formation of government ; because their plenitude is entire liberty, and I have no idea of government which does not imply controul ; the very word implies it ; as man is an imperfect creature, he requires controul, and as he is a reasonable creature he submits to it : —But this system would not be calculated merely for the use of those who devised it.—As men, one of the first and most irresistible impulses, which every one of them would feel from the strong hand of nature, is a love for his children, and a prospective consideration for their happiness. This feeling rooted in the human heart in its wildest state, its most civilized cannot eradicate ; it will adhere to it for ever, and a portion of it emanating from the breast of every man, it will spring up in society in the extended principle of a regard to posterity. The living, says Mr. Paine, are
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not bound by the dead, nor can those who exist legislate for those who do not ; this he applies to the English Revolution, and defends by first principles.

On those first principles, I ask him where he will draw the line. Must every race of men form their own governments, shall the revolution of ages be ascertained by the returns of legislation ? are politics to decide upon chronology, and generations be reckoned by constitutions ; after the first system of laws has been made by the first assemblage of men ; at what time shall the second generation repudiate the wisdom of their fathers, assert their natural equality, and claim their original rights of legislation*. Are they born with no obligations to those institutions which give protection to their infancy, and security to their manhood ? Shall they enjoy as a

* To take this question out of theory, in about twenty years there will be two generations existing in France or America ; one of which will have formed the constitution of the country, and according to Mr. Paine, will be politically free ;—the other (much the majority of the people) during whose infancies or before whose births the constitution was formed, will on the same principle be politically slaves, and will owe no obedience to laws, to the establishment of which they did not consent.

But Mr. Paine will say, they may consent afterwards to submit to them ; how will this consent be ascertained, and till it is, will not every man of them by his natural rights be the judge in his own cause as to the propriety of submitting to them in any instance ? This will be still more strongly the case in every succeeding generation ; because according to Mr. Paine, the obligations of prescription weaken by being repeated.

blessing their having come into a society which
 their predecessors have already established, or will
 its comforts be incomplete because they have not
 contributed to its structure? If this second race
 (culpably passive) submits to ready made happiness,
 shall not the third vindicate the degradation
 and assert the imprescriptible rights of man? I can
 suppose a third and a fourth, and a series of generations,
 sensible of the comforts and obedient to the laws of the
 society in which they were born, not yet informed of that
 sublime truth, that the object of government was presumptuously
 to unmake man, and yet that man was never in the enjoyment
 of his rights except when he was making governments. I can
 suppose many races of men to pass away in a happy ignorance
 of this and other enlightened doctrines, not ashamed of the
 wisdom of experience, and timorous of experiment, venturing
 at most to supply the ravages of time, and provide against
 the encreasing degeneracy of man. It would not shock their
 sensibility of liberty to learn that they were bound by laws
 made by the dead, nor would it be easy to inflict upon their
 natures the unwelcome dignity of indifference to their posterity.
 My heart is not sufficiently cold to be flattered, when my
 nature is painted to me, as insulated in a stately independence,
 —almost denied communication with those about me, and
 cut off from every feeling for those who have gone before,
 and those who are to follow me. Limited in his wisdom,
 man derives experience from the dead; and sensible
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of its importance, bequeaths it to those who are yet to exist ; he is not to be denied prospect and retrospect, and the independence of time present upon that which has past, and that which is to come, would be destructive if it was possible.

From the nature of society I infer the original sacrifice of some of the rights of man ;—from the nature of man I infer the continuation of the sacrifice.

Mr. Paine complains, “ that the error of those who reason on the rights of man, is that they do not go far enough back.” *

This he will not I believe object to me ;—he says, “ the fact must be that the individuals “ themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact with each other to produce a government, and this is the “ only mode in which governments have a right to “ arise, and the only principle on which they have “ a right to exist.”

To this *mode* and to this principle have I gone back ; this I admit, if government was ever formally formed to have been the mode of forming it ; at all events, to be the proper principle to which opinions on government are at this day to be referred ; but I deny the similarity of cases between men forming a government, and men born in a government already formed ;—that it was formed by the

* Rights of Man, Page 22.

rights of man is allowed ; that those rights which formed it, continue after its formation is not ;—— Mr. Paine says, they cease to be natural and become civil rights ; it is enough for my purpose that the natural rights cease. He charges Mr. Burke with omitting to make a distinction between a government out of the people and over the people ; I object to Mr. Paine that he has made the distinction, and confounded it afterwards ; government *was* out of the people and *is* over the people ; Mr. Paine says that the laws of a government are observed by consent, and not by obligation. I perceive in this an antithesis of words and nothing more ; If a man consents to an obligation, he is bound ; and if he is bound, he is not in possession of original natural equality and rights ; and this is as much as I wish to prove.

It is unnecessary to point out the various absurdities and multiplied confusions which would result from the doctrine of man's possessing his natural rights in a state of society, and being judge in his own case as to their exercise ; when you apply this general principle to the minutiae of practical life, the subject can scarcely be treated seriously, and it has been exposed with just ridicule and ingenious irony, in a late publication to which I refer you for much amusement*. A strange perverseness of heart and head, combine in the suggestion and defence of this doctrine. It is a mistake of human

* Jacque's Boureaux Letter to the Whigs of the Capital.

nature,

nature, not prompted by the elegant enthusiasm of the dramatist, who sketching from himself, *drew mankind as they ought to be, not as they are*, but dictated by the sullen spirit of a discontented leveller, whose pencil dipped in his own heart's gall transfuses its poison to his canvass, and stains the human picture in harsh outline, and gloomy shade; it represents mankind not as they are, not as they ought to be, not as they ever can be; it defends itself by remote first principles, and sinks from the realities of life, as it descends into the depths of speculative possibility ~~with~~ with its advocates, imagination, that sweet speculatist operates averfely to its nature by a process of *coarse* refinement; its flights are *from* our dignity, and it abstracts man to debase him.

Mr. Paine discovers the charter of the rights of man in this verse of Genesis; *and God said let us make man in our own image; in the image of God, created he him, male and female created he them*; I confess I should feel a reluctance in making use of this authority on any light occasion; and something more than a reluctance if I were conscious that my application of the sacred page was unfair. I cannot find in the concise and sublime account of our creation, any thing relative to the equality or the rights of man. Mr. Paine considers it, as declaring the rights of man because it says nothing about them. He says the distinction of sexes is pointed out, but no other distinction is even implied. First, is it necessary that an account of the creation
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of the first one man, should be declaratory of the future relations with each other of all his numberless unborn posterity? I cannot think it is; if not, how can their equality be inferred from such a silence, as to their distinctions? distinction implies at least, two persons; how could it be declared in an account of the creation of one *?

I cannot dismiss this passage without observing upon an expression, which tho' it has little to say to the question is worthy of remark. After quoting this verse of Genesis, Mr. Paine adds, "if this is not divine it is at least historical authority;" I know not what is intended by this unprovoked insinuation against the divinity of the scriptures; it appeared to me very wanton; but possibly to depreciate revelation may tend not a little to relax the sense of obligation in general. The sacred

* Mr. Paine says, the distinction of sexes is pointed out and no other.—If distinction is used in all parts of this sentence in the same sense, Mr. Paine will find himself committed with the fair sex.—Distinction in this sense, implies superior and inferior.—Which is the superior sex? If he says the male, he must prepare himself for the *Poissardes* and other female advocates for the Rights of Man, whose activity on this subject was founded in a belief, that the Rights of Women were particularly at stake!—If he says the female is the superior being, I perfectly agree with him.—In such a cause, with such an ally, *I should be confident against the world in arms.*—But the age of chivalry is gone, I fear he and I would be left its solitary defenders, and some enlightened pamphlet would assert, that our system like old governments, presumptuously tended to *unmake man.*

writings

writings contain many exhortations to good order and good government ; their doctrines given by him who made us and knows our natures and our weaknesses, afford little encouragement to the modern presumptuous philosophy of the rights of man ; and their application might be dangerous to its propagation, if the mischief was not defeated by an impeachment of their authority ; I should be very sorry, directly or indirectly to insinuate a charge of this nature against Mr. Paine, if I did not think it impossible that he could advance a position like this in ignorance of its falsity. The very reverse of the inference is the fact ; for if the Old Testament be not divine it is not historical authority. A history of the creation written long after the event cannot be human ; because the writer must have wanted every document of an historian ; a narrative of miracles surpassing human credence and comprehension, recording the personal interference of the Deity with his creatures, declaring wondrous suspensions of the law of nature on many occasions, and revealing the secrets of futurity in the language of prophecy, cannot be a human composition, and if it is not divine, is not historical.

This is the real inference from a supposition that the Mosaic account of the creation is not divine ; and if Mr. Paine's insinuation proceeded from a belief of its being human ; I now ask him what will become of the conclusion he draws from its historical authenticity.

Mr. Paine has given a definition of government in the last page of his work, which appears to me the result of the original mistake; he says, "the end of all political associations is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man, and these are liberty, &c. &c." To the justice of this definition I object;—government, which I suppose he means by political associations, (for I cannot conceive the one without the other) is certainly not instituted for this purpose; the natural and imprescriptible rights of man are perfect equality, and perfect independence. Government is controul—it is the controul of that equality, the restriction of that independence.

For what purpose then is government established? shall not I offend the benevolence of republican principles, if I offer it as my opinion, that the end of government is the *happiness* of man? His very rights are not more natural to man, than many evil dispositions; I do not mean to enter into an enquiry of the origin of evil in the world, but there is evil in the world and much; man, to say the least, is a very imperfect creature, he has strong passions stimulated by violent temptations and resisted by frail resolves; there is in his heart, that abuse of the selfish principle which militates against the social, and which would fill the world with discord, and wrong and violence, if not corrected by the obligations of society and the coercion of laws. I cannot conceive that the government of such a creature, should be founded on principles of perfect equality and perfect liberty.

liberty. He enters into society for those very comforts which would be destroyed if he was allowed to retain his natural rights in it; and the object of government, is to provide for his happiness by curtailing his independence. I am justified in this theory by Mr. Paine himself, in the first page of his *Common Sense*; he defines government to be produced by our wickedness, and to promote our happiness by restraining our vices. On this very principle I ask, can the end of government be the preservation of natural rights? will he purify human wickedness by giving latitude to its perpetration, or restrain vice by the remonstrances of indulgence? This I cannot understand;—I am not actuated by the spirit of a controversialist, in wishing to fasten a contradiction on Mr. Paine; nor is his consistency of sufficient moment to me, that I shall call on him for a reconciliation of his two jarring definitions of government—I am at liberty to choose that which I like best. The definition in *Common Sense* appears to me just, I prefer it to that in the *Rights of Man*; tho' possibly as it was written some fifteen years back, it begins to favour of prescription and falls under the imputation of antiquity; but I wish to know how government produced by the wickedness of man and promoting his happiness, by restraining his vices, can be supposed to leave him in the full exercise of his natural rights. There is but one way of solving this difficulty, let us not presumptuously unmake but new model man, repeal his imperfections, proscribe his vices, and by a general confederation

exile wickedness from the world. This will effect the purpose desired, restraints will vanish with their necessity, and the Rights of Man resume that throne which the coercion of governments had usurped.

This will be an undertaking worthy of the enterprise of that republican spirit which

—— Jamdudum aliquid invadere magnum,
—— agitat—— nec placidâ contenta quiete est.

But alas ! we have Mr. Paine's authority for it, that a vitiated body cannot reform itself :—here would be the difficulty ; this is one of the few things which is above the projection or execution of levellers : their genius may devise, and their industry accomplish the fall of kings and kingdoms, the convulsions of empires, and the fate of nations. —With these humbler deeds let them be content ; but nature defies their innovation : man they cannot reform, and as long as restlessness, and discontent, and turbulence continue in the catalogue of his faults, they will themselves remain monuments of the impossibility of the attempt.

If the nature of man is frail and prone to wickedness ; if to restrain that wickedness, government is necessary, shall government defeat its end by its means, and give to his vices that liberty which it would be almost dangerous to entrust to his virtues ? I cannot conceive it ; nor can I think that in society, whose object is his happiness, and whose
origin

origin is his frailty ; man retains those full natural prerogatives and rights, which he possessed :

When wild in woods the noble savage ran.

If I am now asked the question, which Mr. Paine puts to Mr. Burke: *has man then no rights ?* I answer he has many ; I believe there is not that person existing whose principles run so far into the extreme opposite to Mr. Paine, as to say he has not. It is equally offensive to truth, to say that man has no rights, and that he has his full natural rights ; and I must observe, that Mr. Paine's argument throughout his pamphlet, seems to offer his readers the alternative of these two propositions both false ; pushes the one upon the fear of the other, and affirms the latter on the negation of the former : Mr. Paine is not to be informed of the false logick of such a proceeding. The end of government (I repeat it) is the happiness of man.—I have endeavoured to shew that the full enjoyment of his rights would defeat that end : I now insist, that the total privation of those rights, would equally defeat it.—To come closer to the question, it may be asked me, are governments incorruptible, and if not, shall their faults be perpetual ? Is the reform of a bad government within the competence of the residue of the rights of man ? I answer it is. If the government of a country in process of time, becomes unfit for the purposes of its establishment ; if it resists and not promotes the happiness ; if it encourages and not restrains the vices of mankind, and makes artificial more dangerous than natural society :

society: then do I admit, that the people have a right (not a natural one, because the exercise of such a right could not have existed in a state of nature) but a political right, the result of convenience, not of nature, to redress the grievance. And I would estimate the exact quantity of this right, by the means of its exercise: it will be maintained as long as its exercise tends to restore the violated happiness of mankind, it will be outraged when it renders the redress a greater grievance than the grievance itself. Upon this principle I shall say one word on the subject of France;—France wanted a reform; the first delegation from the people was the due exercise of their right, the subsequent transactions in France, were the outrage of it; the government of France wanted a reform, not a convulsion; to this there is a trite retort that the reform could not be effected without the convulsion, and was cheaply purchased by it.—The example of Poland answers the first part of this objection, and the unsettled and extravagant state of the French nation answers the second; I have been reluctantly led to say even so much of France; I have wandered from the subject to the pretext; the subject of Mr. Paine's pamphlet is England;—how then will this doctrine apply to England—the people's right of reforming any government is not a natural right; the possibility of its existence depends on the contingency of the governments requiring reform. Mr. Paine's first principle then, that the people of England have a natural indefeasible right to give themselves a new constitution, must

must stand or fall, with the fate of his second assertion that England requires a new constitution. This I shall now proceed to consider, first observing that the premise from which he draws his conclusion requires for its own defence, that very conclusion for a premise.

There is another species of right in the people which I cannot define, but will endeavour to describe.—If in a country well constituted and well governed, in which the people have nothing to complain of, but the unvaried dulness of public prosperity and private security; a man should appear of acute genius and turbulent temper, who thinks ambition easier gratified by debasing his superiors to himself, than by exalting himself to his superiors; and thus becomes a leveller upon principle. If this man should write a treatise in which he grafts sedition upon metaphysics, and recommends innovation by crying down prescription; if he ridicules any retrospect to the experience of past generations, and yet for his own purposes founds arguments upon the days of Adam; if he proves the equality of all men from the creation of one, and shews the present inequality of distinction to be an invasion of the rights of nature; that the majority suffer by this inequality, and are themselves the only judges of the means of its redress; that the government of their country has presumptuously *unmade them*, and that they are earnestly called upon to rescue themselves from the disgrace. If
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this book written in strong language and artful sophisms, falls into the hands of a few men of the same principles as its author; if they at an abated price, send it like a cheapened drug through the inferior classes of society, for whose perusal it is calculated, as being just up to their feelings, and above their understandings, it might happen that a deluded people would swallow the mental poison, and in the delirious moments of its operation they might overturn and deface the collected wisdom of ages; this they might do because they are many—because the people in a country consist of more millions than their governors do of hundreds; because they have *power* to do it—then would they who had administered to their infuriation say they had a *right* to do it; power successfully exercised is easily called a right, and as the mass of the people in every country possesses the weight of power, whenever artifice is able to bring into action the power of the people which must be successful, the same artifice backed by success is able to call it the right of the people. This is the other kind of right of the people; I hope we are very far from witnessing any instance of its exercise*.

I have

* To prevent misrepresentation, I once for all give my creed on the rights of man—That man by going into society, or being born in it, surrenders the occasional exercises of many of his natural rights to society for the purpose of government—I say the occasional exercise, to provide for the case of necessary and constitutional resistance.

Mr.

I have now done with the subject of rights, and Mr. Paine and I are at issue on a question more proper for men of this world:—Has England a constitution or not?—It is not expected that Mr. Paine's fine spun distinctions between a constitution and a convention should be attended to, they would lead into that labyrinth for the texture of which they were fabricated. The simple questions are these,—Is England well governed, well administered?—Is the people's happiness effected?—Is the people of England politically free?—There are many parts of Europe in which England is only known by report, and many parts of America, in which it is only known by misrepresentation; in those places if Mr. Paine's book is read, it must leave as a natural impression upon the minds of its readers, that England is one of the most enslaved and unhappy countries on the face of the globe; strangers who read it will feel this impression much more forcibly than we who live in the midst of daily contradictions to it, and until we take this into consideration, we cannot sufficiently estimate the slander propagated against the

Mr. Paine's Creed appears to be this—That man going into society puts his rights into common stock, in order to strengthen them, reserving them and their exercise to himself.

From whence the inference is, that in any case in which he finds himself strong enough not to want the co-operation of society, he may fully exercise his own full rights, and thus his right to do any thing will be always in a ratio compounded of his ability and inclination to do it.

fair fame of the country. Let me put it to Mr. Paine's good sense,—Is that country very inflamed —Is that government very arbitrary, in which a man is suffered with impunity to utter a libel against its character, to send into the world scandalous falsehoods against its constitution, and stimulate its people to rebellion.

Mr. Paine if not a native, is a citizen of America, the constitution of his country is Republican, and no one would presume to blame him if he published in Philadelphia a panegyric on Democracy ; but will the advocate of the rights of man allow no rights of nations ? Does the title in his first page of *Secretary for Foreign Affairs*, authorize him to import into our hemisphere the politics of his, and after being instrumental in alienating her colonies from England, consummate his philanthropic labours by embroiling England with herself.

What would be the consequence, if a writer of talents equal to Mr. Paine's, should publish a book in Philadelphia, under the mask of an answer to a treatise on the French revolution, in which he would represent Republicanism as the worst possible form of government ; insist on the absurdity of thousands of people being governed by a Congress to the election of which they never gave their assent ; paint the perfections of royalty in all the colours of sophistry and eloquence, and call upon the people to adopt it by the imprescriptible right they possess of choosing their own constitution. I know
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not how far tolerant the government of America is in matters of this nature, but I wish to know whether it would be utterly passive if in one of its greatest cities, a self created body of men should obtrude on the public their approbation of the tenets of this book, and subscribe to a fund for disseminating its principles through the provinces, at a sixth of its selling price, that it might be within the purchase of the populace. If these insults to the constitution of America were quietly passed over, and if neither the author or propagators of this book were interrupted in the indulgence of their opinions, I should naturally conclude that America was a very free state, and I claim the same inference in the part of this country. However, Mr. Paine must excuse me, if I insinuate a surmise that possibly this might not be the case, the government might overlook it, but that superior order of beings paramount to all government (the people) might not; every one of that august body possessing in himself the natural rights of man, might on this provocation exercise them as on former occasions, and if a doubt had been insinuated against their existence, a little tarring and feathering would establish their reality.

Is England then that ill governed, unconstituted, enslaved country which Mr. Paine's book represents it, *the very reverse of what it ought to be, and what it is said to be**? Is it necessary for its ho-

* Rights of Man, Page 30.

nour, and for its freedom, that the people of England should rise and rescue itself from the disgrace of the Norman conquest, *by following the example of all France?* In thinking or speaking well of the constitution of my country, I subject myself to that charge of prejudice, which every enemy to innovations must expect from the advocates of experiment:—prejudice is a heavy charge, easily advanced by those who arrogating to think for you, are disappointed by your thinking for yourself.—They seem to forget, that every time it is brought forward it is capable of retort, and esteem it a grievance, that when I hesitate between their opinion and mine, the experience of ages should turn the scale. I own myself guilty of so much prejudice, that after thinking on any subject, if my reason, my experience, and inferences from the experience of others, corroborated by authorities I respect, all combine in the formation of an opinion, I make up my mind and am satisfied with it. By this unfortunate turn of mind, I feel myself prejudiced in favour of the constitution of England. It unites in itself those three forms of government, each of which different countries have at different times adopted as the best, and by the mutual counteraction of which the benefits of all are most likely to be produced, and the evils of any to be avoided; the happiness of the people is most likely to be the object of the laws, where the laws are made by the people themselves, in a sense so wisely qualified, as to avoid equally the mischiefs of absolute dictation

dictation from the few to the many, and the dangerous theory of universal legislation. The truth of these opinions is best proved by experience, the causes produce their effects; the people of England is a great, flourishing and happy people. The life, the property, or the liberty of the meanest creature in the country, is not in the power of the greatest.—The highest and proudest situations in the state, are within the reach of talents and industry : justice is administered to all, and refused to none :—the cottage, and the person of the English peasant, are as sacred as the residence or the robes of any king in Europe.—The commutation of the natural rights of man in England is only this : let him pay obedience to the laws, and he will receive protection from them ; they are calculated for his good, and restrain him only so far as they promote it ; their acknowledged character is public good, and the language they hold forth to the people is, that “ *to enjoy is to obey.*” If this is not liberty, if this is not prosperity, I know not what is.—I appeal from Mr. Paine’s general slanders against the constitution of England, to himself for the truth of what I have stated, I do not think he will deny it ; he may single out instances of abuse, and plead them in argument against the use :—there are such instances in the English constitution, for this simple reason ; because it is the government of human creatures by human creatures, instances originating in human imperfection, which therefore will be found under every form of government. Is a Republic

public in practice the same Utopia which it is upon paper—will its name unmake man? will it extirpate his vices? will it banish evil from the world, and if it does not, will it not have abuses? Let not then the imperfections of men be insidiously forgotten for the purpose of defeating their happiness, and when Mr. Paine magnifies the abuses, which essentially attach to the best of human governments, let him recollect that their foundation is in the constitution of man and not of the state; what then are the crying wrongs with which Mr. Paine insults the ears of Englishmen and abuses the ears of strangers; might not a foreigner who had read his book, if the perusal did not deter him from the attempt, be induced to visit England to gratify a speculative mind by a contemplation of political iniquity carried to its height; might not he on his arrival in London, enquire in what street stood the Bastile, what minister of state issued Letters de Cachet, and when experience corrected his mistake, what must he think of the slander which had occasioned it:—He would find those grievances in Mr. Paine's pamphlet and there alone.

Conquest and tyranny, says Mr. Paine, transplanted themselves with William the Conqueror from Normandy into England, and the country is yet disfigured with the marks; this moderate assertion is followed by a pious ejaculation,——may then the example of all*

* Page 29.

France contribute to regenerate the freedom which a province of it destroyed.—By putting the words Conquest and Tyranny together, and then saying the country is yet disfigured with the marks, Mr. Paine by a process very common with him, affirms of two things what is not true of each;—the country is certainly yet disfigured by the marks of the conquest, so far as it is an event in the history of the country; this is a fact which Mr. Paine has coupled with an assumption that it is yet disfigured by the marks of tyranny,—an assumption because it is yet to be proved. But first, as to conquest—that reproach from which the nation ought to rescue itself†; this is a reproach which England shares in common with almost every country in the world, and from which it is impossible she now can rescue herself;—they have all been conquered at different times;—England was conquered in the year 1066,—at that time the people ought and might have rescued themselves from the disgrace, but in the year 1791, it is a remote historical event, and the disgrace can by no means be wiped away, except by expunging the fact from our annals and from the memory of mankind. It is somewhat extraordinary, that such a violent enemy to prescription as Mr. Paine, should yet, when it answers his own purpose, discover so much of the spirit of an antiquarian;—the living shall owe no obligations to the dead, every retrospect for the purpose of good order and government to the

† Page 31 & 58.

wisdom of a past generation is forbidden ; it assumed the character of a testator in dictating to posterity—but when disgrace is entailed upon the country, Mr. Paine goes back to the conquest for the record of its title and claims the inheritance—According to him the disgrace incurred by England when conquered by Normandy, eight hundred years ago, is at this day to be done away by the example of all France, which it is prayed may regenerate the freedom a province of it destroyed.

We are now to discover those instances of *tyranny* which call upon the people of England to adopt the example of France ; where then are to be found those stains only to be washed out with civil blood ? It behoves every Englishman to examine well, before he takes the advice of an American, to embrace the example of France ; perhaps he will not in the enquiry discover causes sufficient to justify the degradation of the nobility, the confusion of orders, the plunder of the Church and the imprisonment of the king ; when he sees the industry of London armed into a militia, and the army of England bribed into licentiousness ; when the administration of justice devolves with the execution of it to that source of all government the people ; when the summary *lanterne* becomes a court of ease to the Old Baily and supercedes the presumptuous antiquity of juries ; when the peerage is trodden under foot, the parliament disbanded, and their majesties immur'd in the glooms of St. James's, he may possibly ask himself the question
why

why he followed the example of France. I have Mr. Paine's own authority that the constitution of England is not tyrannical—he says*, *In the case of Charles I. and James II. of England, the revolt was against the personal despotism of men; whereas in France it was against the hereditary despotism of the established government.*—If then the English constitution abused by personal despotism, contained in its own nature no hereditary despotism of government to justify revolt, where are the marks of tyranny which disfigure the land to this day? except Mr. Paine will say that the English constitution is more despotic now than it was in the times of Charles I. and James II.

Nothing appears to provoke Mr. Paine's indignation so much as *monarchy*, and here he argues not against the abuse but against the nature of the English constitution; his opinions on this subject dispersed ~~passion~~ through his *pamphlet*, his *miscellaneous* chapter and his *conclusion* when brought together, may be reduced to three propositions:

That, monarchy in general is bad.

That, hereditary monarchy in particular is bad.

And that, the Hanoverian succession in England is very bad.

One would suppose that if Mr. Paine had succeeded in the proof of the first of these proposi-

tions, he need not have given himself much trouble to prove the other two which are essentially involved in it. As to whether monarchy in general is a good or bad form of government. Mr. Paine's opinion being that of a zealous member of the Republic of America, and mine being that of a person loyally attached to the limited monarchy of Great Britain, are equally undeserving of attention; the first principles upon which he will impeach the justice of one man's governing many, I reject as an unfair ground of argument, and do not expect he will give much credit to the foundations of my opinion, or as he may call it, prejudice on the subject; for in the formation of this opinion I am, I confess, not altogether unbiassed by the opinions of great writers and great statesmen, by the history of almost all nations and the experience of all governments modern and ancient; but as these are considerations below the dignity of a liberal mind which rejects experience as dangerous and expedience as trifling, I will not insist on them. However, in an unguarded moment, Mr. Paine pays an unwilling compliment to the sanction of antiquity, by charging monarchy with being a late and modern invasion of the rights of man, and it is necessary to remind him that as far as history enables us to carry on researches, it discovers kingly government to be one of the earliest institutions of the oldest times. He may certainly insist that it could not have been established by the first formers of society out of the rights of man; but in this first formation

mation of society. Mr. Paine's imagination supplies the want of history, and I refuse my assent to authority which is neither divine or historical ;— so weak an argument as a reference to former times I would not have advanced, if Mr. Paine did not seem to consider the want of it a blemish in the character of monarchy : another mistake is this assertion, that, *All that part of the government of England which begins with the office of constable, and proceeds through the department of magistrate, quarter session and general assize, including trial by jury, is Republican government, nothing of monarchy appears in any part of it, except the name which William the Conqueror imposed upon the English, that of obliging them to call him their Sovereign Lord the King* *. First, if nothing of monarchy appears in them but a name, it is not much ; secondly, monarchy in them and the English constitution at large is of a much older date, for those very institutions we are indebted to Alfred, who was a monarch, and there is no instance of any other form of government to be found in the history of England, only in that late and disgraceful period of national delirium, when the title of a Commonwealth sanctioned the eversion of the constitution, and royalty in the person of Cromwell purchased the extension of its powers by the surrender of its name, the usurper declined that blood stained crown which would have sat uneasy on his head ; but its weight transferred itself to the sceptre he

retained, he swayed with a heavy hand their united forces, and except *the nick-name** of the title, *was every inch a king†*.

This much to correct mistake by facts, and misrepresentation by history.—That a chief magistrate is necessary in every state (call him by what name you will) I am convinced. Mr. Paine has that contempt for titles, that he will not quarrel with me for a name; but the executive power (however qualified) must reside in unity, whether you call the person a king, a stadtholder, or a president.—The Republican constitution of America evinces this truth; whoever has read Mr. Washington's late speech to the Houses of Assembly must admit it.—Had I not missed in it the words *my Lords*, I should from the beginning, have supposed it a speech from our king to our parliament; and should not have been undeceived until I had seen the name of George Washington, instead of George Rex.—Even in France, where the wild fire of republicanism has consumed every thing ancient, Monarchy has escaped the general conflagration. They have shackled the king in his authority, but they have put on his chains with respect.—The language of the National Assembly in its most violent measures against him, has been that of decent dictation, and qualified insult.—His imprisonment was represented to him (as cutting off his head was to another prince) to be altogether for his good;

* Rights of Man, Page 30. † Lear.

but the abolition of the monarchy was not once insinuated—the wildest fanatic in France has not so much as questioned the necessity of its continuance:—they have indeed, brought about an important revolution in the royal title, and changed the name of King of France, into that of King of *the* French. This and some other experiments they have effected in their state laboratory, but the crown though defaced, has escaped undestroyed from the furnace; not as Mr. Paine asserts, that *the goodness of the man, and respect for his personal character, are the only things that preserve the appearance of its existence**.—Because it appears to be preserved upon principle, for this good reason:—that one of the first cares of the assembly was, to regulate the succession; possibly then Mr. Paine's wishes and prophecies of the downfall of monarchy, are not so near gratification and accomplishment as he imagines.

Let me beg your attention to a very extraordinary proposition into which Mr. Paine seems to have collected all his detached arguments against monarchy.—*If monarchy (says he) is a useless thing, why is it kept up any where; and if a necessary thing, how can it be dispensed with?* † If a logical name can be discovered for it, this is a kind of interrogatory dilemma, and every vice of a dilemma which can make the use of it sophistical, is to be found here.—In the first place, to prove that

* Page 59.

† Ibid.

monarchy must be either utterly useless, or absolutely necessary, which this argument pre-supposes, it must be shewn, that all countries require one form of government, and that there is but one form of government good — This I deny, because all experience contradicts it; but admitting it, will the inference hold? — Certainly not, for it is liable to retort. — The same process of reasoning will prove a contradictory proposition, and in so doing, will be vitiated. Let me substitute the words “republican government,” for that of “monarchy,” and I can infer every thing of republics which he does of monarchies, by the same argument and with the same truth, perhaps more; because if the inutility of either depends on the possibility of its being dispensed with, there are more countries which dispense with republics than with monarchy; but this sophism will not only prove contradictories, it will prove too much; there is no opinion or institution not received by all mankind, of which the same inference cannot be deduced; which he concludes of monarchy — If this mode of reasoning be conclusive, see the advantage which can be taken of it: — *If Christianity be a useless thing, why is it kept up any where, and if a necessary thing, how can it be dispensed with?* — This is a statement precisely parallel to Mr. Paine’s, and any person who wishes to make a similar use of it, has only to shew that christianity is dispensed with in many parts of the world, that therefore by the second proposition it is not a necessary thing, and of course the first horn of the dilemma, decides upon its inutility; it
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is a mode of argument which proves any thing and every thing, and of course proves nothing.

Possibly a consciousness of the weakness of his dilemma induced Mr. Paine to attack hereditary monarchy, for I cannot attribute it to any other motive, that after objecting to monarchy in the abstract, he should take the trouble of arguing against a particular description of it; this is to be accounted for by one of the following suppositions: his argument is, *All monarchy is bad; but hereditary monarchy is worst of all*; or else, *all monarchy is bad, even hereditary monarchy, the best species of it is bad*; if the first is his meaning, it is a nugatory proposition because it must stand or fall with the fate of the original argument against monarchy in general, which I consider disposed of; if the second is his meaning, it admits of itself the superiority of hereditary monarchy to elective, which is as much as I wish to prove: this would supercede the necessity, if with thinking men there could exist a necessity, of proving the superiority of hereditary monarchy to elective: However, as in theory, the one has much plausible merit, it may not be amiss to shew its danger in practice. A nation can scarcely be visited by a greater curse than a disputed succession; in an elective monarchy this curse must return at every demise, and its natural returns which would depend on the life of kings, ^{are} frequently anticipated by violence. A crown is worth ambition, and no claimant would ever want competitors; in this competition, the right of election must

must reside in the sword ; this appears from every history of disputed successions, from the imperial throne of Rome, to which the legions were the electors, and the prætorian guards the representatives of the people ; or if examples more near our own times were necessary, who wishes to see again *the heavy days* of York and Lancaster.

But it is not necessary to recur to history for this ; we have witnessed in our time the exemplification of the doctrine.—Poland was indebted to her elective monarchy, for her late unhappy and degraded situation.—The necessary consequence of that form of government was, a divided and an oppressive Aristocracy. An insulted king and enslaved people, rose up against the grievance and effected the late happy, wise and bloodless revolution, and one of its first articles is the establishment of the throne on the stable principles of inheritance.

But I have already endeavoured to shew that Mr. Paine is of my opinion on this subject ; and what confirms it, is the violent dislike he expresses to two recent instances in our history, in which the crown departed from the strict line of succession, and became in some measure elective.

These two instances of the Prince of Orange and the Elector of Hanover ascending the throne of England, provoke much of his indignation, and he expresses himself on the occasion with a warmth of temper scarcely restrained by the usual decency of his

of his stile*. This antipathy to the establishment of William the Third, and the family of George the First, must proceed, either from their being kings, in which case I consign it to the fate of ~~his~~ parent proposition against monarchy in the abstract, or

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* The following are a few of Mr. Paine's expressions on this subject :—

Rights of Man, Page 39. Mankind will then scarcely believe that a country calling itself free, would send to Holland for a man, and clothe him with power on purpose to put themselves in fear of him, and give him almost a million sterling a-year for leave to submit themselves and their posterity, like bond-men and bond-women, for ever.

Page 56. It is somewhat curious to observe, that although the people of England have been in the habit of talking about Kings, it is always a foreign house of Kings; hating foreigners, yet governed by them. It is now the House of Brunswick, one of the petty tribes of Germany.

Page 56. God help that country thought I, be it England or elsewhere, whose liberties are to be protected by German principles of government and princes of Brunswick.

It would be wrong to pay any attention except in a note, to Mr. Paine's idle story of a deranged Norman gentleman, who offered himself to Doctor Franklin to be King of America.—The unfortunate person's extravagance does not afford me all that amusement it does Mr. Paine.—I should not even take this much notice of his other anecdote, in which he favours the world with a conference on politics, held by himself with a Brunswick soldier prisoner, if in the above decent observation upon it, relative to the present reigning family of Great Britain, he did not make use of a sophism already exposed, which to use an expression of his own, is one of the *Shibboleths* by which he may be known,

else to their being elected, in which case he admits the excellence of hereditary monarchy, or else to their being usurpers to the prejudice of the Stuart family: It is a strange association of political contradictions,

known.—He here couples German principles of government and princes of Brunswick, as inseparable propositions, and concludes of them as of one:—what credit is to be given to a writer, who uses such school-boy sophistry? but the book was calculated for the vulgar, upon whom only it can impose. The people of England dread no German principles of government from princes of Brunswick.—What is meant by a prince of Brunswick? his present majesty is an Englishman; but his grandfather it may be said, was not.—Mr. Paine, with whom every man and every age is an existence, independent of all former ones, would scarcely go back two generations, if some odium was not to reward the research.

But Mr. Paine's opinions of his Majesty, are best to be known from his pamphlet of *Common Sense*, lately re-published in this capital, no doubt for some good purpose;—two of the most decent and least violent expressions in that book applied to the King, are the Pharoah of England, and the Emulator of Charles the First.

Paine's Pamphlet, Page 59. If government be what Mr. Burke describes it, “a contrivance of human wisdom,” I might ask him, if wisdom was at such a low ebb in England, that it was become necessary to import it from Holland and from Hanover? and there could exist no more real occasion in England to have sent for a Dutch Stadtholder, or a German Elector, than there was in America to have done a similar thing.—What are those men kept for?

Paine's Pamphlet, Page 60. When the people of England sent for George the First, (and it would puzzle a wiser man than Mr. Burke to discover for what he could be wanted, or what service he

tradictories, reserved for this speculative age ; to behold in one and the same man the advocate of plenary liberty and unlimited rights, the enemy of the revolution and the defender of the Stuarts. I appeal to the good sense of every man whether I do violence to Mr. Paine in drawing these conclusions from his book ; his opinions on monarchy are reducible to the three heads above mentioned, *monarchy in general, hereditary monarchy, and the Hanoverian succession* ; reducible because he inveighs against all and each ; Of these three the second proposition admits of two meanings, one of which is defeated by the first, and the other by the third, and the inference from all together taken every way, is that the author by a *bland assimilation* unites in his own person the two political characters most at war with each other, and most odious to an Englishman, a Republican and a Jacobite ; at least I cannot but congratulate Mr. Paine upon the discovery of a stratagem by which his book meets with an equally favourable reception from two opposite parties, and runs no risk of disapprobation from any, but that description of men who are well affected to the present government ; to the influence of which of those parties he is indebted for the patronage of the Whigs of the Capital, these gentlemen can best determine ; perhaps it may be to a liberal coalition of both.

he could render),—the union cannot exist ; and it might easily have been foreseen, that German Electors would make German Kings.

This is all I shall say on the subject of monarchy: I do not mean to deal unfairly with Mr. Paine, if any one can reconcile his doctrines to consistency I am open to conviction; I forbear giving here my own opinions, I believe it is not necessary; the principles of the Revolution and the Hanoverian succession at this day, I trust, want neither explanation or defence; I have satisfied myself with shewing the tendency of Mr. Paine's argument, convinced that the best answer to a man who dresses logical forms in warm declamation, is to take it to pieces in plain language, and shew what is to be made of it.

Next to monarchy, *peerage* and *hereditary dignities* seem to have attracted the greatest share of Mr. Paine's reprehension;—I know no argument against peerage in general, which must not when pushed, resolve itself into the first principle of original natural equality; the application of which, to the present state of society, I might with great justice refuse to admit: however, let us examine it; is there any natural equality among men? * Does not every moment's experience contradict the opinion and shew the natural inequality among men in thousands of instances? Nay, if we abstract our ideas from the realities of life as much as we can, and speculate on the first existence of men

* Of natural equality, I understand no more than this, that no man by nature possesses that superiority over another, by which he can be justified in wronging him.

in their native woods, will even imagination discover in the vision the equality of men? Different degrees of strength, of intellect, of talents†, of good dispositions, will all be found even in the wildest theories on the subject of our nature, to contradict this popular first principle; but when it comes to be tried by an estimate of advanced society, which every day removes it farther and farther from truth, it will be found a flattering falsehood. If this equality was in the construction of our nature, or the intention of our Maker, why do our breasts acknowledge an eternal ambition to resist it? why do we feel a restless passion for distinction? a love of fame, and that thirst for pre-eminence which brings all our best qualities into action, stimulates our worthiest resolves, and even in its abuse, is the *great infirmity of noble minds*;—are these dispositions probationary temptations, in the resistance of which we accomplish the ends of our being, and contribute to the virtuous perfections of natural equality? I cannot think it; I do not find any thing in my heart which makes me sicken at the superiority of another, save only

† I recollect indeed to have read a treatise, in which the author labours much, to prove that all men are born with equal talents, and that apparent differences of genius, are only attributed to education.

The criticism made on the book was, that the author was interested in the proof of his system, as no opinion could be more favourable to his own production.

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a chastened ambition distinguishing envy from emulation ; this is not I trust from a meanness of spirit, I am too proud to be envious ; I shall not pretend to say, whether this feeling more dignifies the character of man, or the principle of the leveller, who beginning in disgust at superiority, finds its eminence inaccessible, and in order to reduce it to himself, compounds with his inferiors on the terms of equalization.

This doctrine of equality in rank is founded upon principles which if pursued would conclude for equality in property. What right has any man who is but my fellow creature, to dress himself in a distinction which seems to claim a superiority of species ? this is the language of the leveller of ranks ; the leveller of property has as plausible a plea. Why should my fellow creature enjoy the luxuries while I want the comforts of life ; am not I his equal ? follow these principles up to all they will prove, and even the Agrarian law will appear a monster of injustice and unequal distribution. Let us speculate as we please, eminence and inferiority of worth, will always produce degrees of estimation, which will constitute ranks ; and industry and indolence will always produce degrees of property : this must happen, because it is the operation of our passions upon our nature.

The theory of the political world like that of our earth, may be calculated on the supposition of a smooth and level surface, and yet the truth of these theories be in no manner affected by the inequalities

qualities of either sphere: these inequalities invisible to the rapt eyes of the Astronomer and Metaphysician, “*in a fine phrenzy rolling*,” force themselves on the observation of us humbler inhabitants of the planet, and the sublimest speculations, cannot make us insensible to their existence; I indeed recollect a pleasant intention attributed to the National Assembly of France, who in their rage against every species of distinction, meditated a decree to level all the mountains of France as types of peerage and emblems of Aristocracy; this public spirited resolve, the execution of which I suppose nothing prevented but its impossibility, would have enabled those philanthropic legislators to have exclaimed with all the superiority of literal signification in the figurative words of Louis when he concluded the family compact, *Il n’y a plus des Pyrenees**; And if this could have been accomplished it would be one of the few speculative projections which would have entirely answered the purpose of its intention; it would be effective, but the *level of man* is impossible and ideal: the elasticity of ambition though bent to the earth, will derive spring from restraint and rebound to its expansion: the surface of the globe once levelled would never again require the political plane.—In the fallen hills there would revive no more spirit of elevation than in the meanest vale which called upon the mountains to cover it—and the ploughshare of the exalted peasant would for ever insult

* The Pyrenees are no more.

the humbled and hoary dignities of Mount Blanc; But the world of man is not formed of such sluggish clay, touched once with the Promethean spark, its fire may be smothered, but cannot be extinguished;—the cold hearted speculatists of France may heap upon the generous flames of ambitious pre-eminence all the upstart clods of the valley, but it will burst from its prison with restored and dreadful splendor, and let them beware its conflagration.

Is then the love of honour a nuisance, and the reward of it a *nick-name*—have all those great men, those *slaves* to honour, (whose names history will record, and posterity cherish, when the memories of agitating republicans shall not surmount their own vulgar level) pursued a phantom, and enjoyed a ridicule? Have they wooed a Goddess, and embraced a cloud? Was Africanus a *nick-name**? Was that title misplaced gratitude in Rome, or ill directed ambition in Scipio? Did he cease to be a good citizen, because he raised himself above his fellow citizens, by deserving well of his country, and raising them above what they were?—This is a theory, which my head and heart refuse: every country requires the exertion of merit—no man is insensible to the reward of distinction—ambition is a stimulative to exertion, and a conferred dignity is an example of its success.

* Page 32. Every title is a nick-name.

This, I mean to meet the objection to peerage upon first principle ;—the same spirit of first principle discovers absurdities in the inheritance of honours: on this subject I shall wave every argument from authority, antiquity, and experience; these are modes of reasoning, *foolishness to the levelers, and stumbling blocks to republicans*, I shall therefore wave them and meet them on their own field of first principle. The institution of honours had for its object, to provoke and ^{re}~~re~~munerate exertion; in proportion as its means are directed to the human heart, will its end be promoted. Mr. Paine and I differ very much in our opinions of the human heart; I cannot conceive the soul of man satisfied with limiting its views to that world, which its existence will survive; there is not a feeling in man, which does not betray in itself a longing after immortality; his passions all push themselves beyond the grave, resist its sting, and dispute its victory. Love, too exquisite not to be perishable, rekindles its extinguished flame in the persons of its pledges; and man feels a disinterested passion, the desires of which are his own, and the enjoyment are another's, in the prospect of his children's good—he speculates upon their aggrandizement, and his heart warms to the thought, though he knows it will be cold in the grave ere it can be gratified: it is thus with his every feeling, thus the thirst for distinction extends itself into that lust for fame, which will not be satiated with less than an eternity of honour; and thus the desire of happiness spreads its anxious

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wings, finds no resting place on earth, and soars to heaven.

These opinions of human nature may appear as visionary as Mr. Paine's of human rights. I have formed these opinions of man from a belief that he is a social creature, possessed of an immortal soul. It is impossible not to speculate when you answer arguments from first principles; I do not like to be visionary, but my visions are different from Mr. Paine's; it may be asked how I interpret mine? how I apply those opinions? if the institution of honours has for its end to stimulate ambition, and that ambition looks beyond the grave, will not the perpetuation of the prize encrease the emulation? is there nothing to enhance an honour in the consideration that it is to be transmitted to the children of your affection, and that you are the ennobler of many? Is ambition half gratified or desert half rewarded by a distinction perishable as yourself, to be laid down ere it is well won, and crumble into dust with your remains? Is the record of merit to be entrusted to the ungrateful memory of mankind---shall its reward be late and its enjoyment short? That deduction from strict justice is not very severe and is certainly very politic, which indulges the manes of the father with the honours of the son, and forbids man in the contemplation of his mortality, to look upon his inducements as insufficient, or his rewards as incomplete. The wreath of fame would not be worth
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the wear if it was not evergreen, and the laurel is its emblem, because it does not wither. In these considerations I discover a probable and wise origin of hereditary dignities, as far as their institution regards the person upon whom they were first conferred; in regard to him the reward of merit was enlarged, and in regard to others the encouragement to exertion was encreased: but the wisdom of hereditary dignities does not rest here; there is a principle in the heart of man, which every wise government will encourage, because it is the auxiliary of virtue; I mean the principle of honour, which in those moments of weakness, when conscience slumbers, watches over the deserted charge, and engages pride in the defence of integrity; it is a sanction of conduct, which the imagination lends to virtue, is itself the reward, and inflicts shame as the punishment; the audacity of vice may despise fear, the sense of remorse may be steeled, art may elude temporal, and impiety defy eternal vengeance; but honour holds the scourges of shame, and he is hardened indeed, who trembles not under its lash; even if the publicity of shame be avoided, its sanction is not destroyed.—Every one suffers, when ashamed of himself, and the blushes of the heart are agony.—The dread of shame is the last good quality which forsakes the breast, and the principle of honour frequently retains it when every other motive of good conduct has abandoned the heart. This sentiment must ever be in proportion to a man's opinions of what is ex-

pected from him, and in proportion as he is taught that much is expected from him, will it swell in his bosom and sharpen his sensibility. — I cannot discover then a mere *diminutive childishness**, in the institution of hereditary dignities, if they cherish this sentiment, and if this sentiment cherishes virtue, and France has *breeched herself*† into manhood, to little purposes of good government, in putting down the delusion, if a delusion it is. — An establishment is something more than *puerile*, || which gives encouragement to virtue, dignity to worth, adds the idea of great to good, and makes that splendid which was useful. — Society was made for man, and as man is various and frail, and vain, it does not disdain to promote his happiness, by playing on his foibles; its strength is armed against his fears; his hopes are fed by its rewards, and its blandishments are directed to his vanities. — Virtue coldly entertained in every other corner of the heart, will take a strong hold in the pride of man. She has often erected her temple on the tombs of a glorious ancestry, and the world has been indebted to the names of the dead, for the virtues of the living. — These things have consequences, which even if their origin was bad, would make me forget it. — I cannot survey the proud monuments of a long and illustrious nobility, like vulgar dust, and call them *gewgaws*† with republican phlegm, for I see in them, the record of what is great, and the sti-

* Rights of Man, Page 32. † Ibid. || Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

mulant to what is good. The sound of an honourable title tells not like *gibberish** to my ear, if it swells the note of Fame in the ear of him who claims it, and challenges him to deserve it: there is little to be feared from a man's believing, that some of that blood runs in his veins, which his ancestors have shed for their country; it will curdle at his heart, at the suggestion of its disgrace.

*Neque imbellem feroces,
Progenerant aquilæ columbam.*

Why then discourage this elegant superstition, and deface the venerable and stately temples of that political mythology, wherein virtue was worshipped in the garb of honour? If these are the principles of honours, Mr. Paine has attacked them with equal vulgarity of ridicule, and short sightedness of policy; nor will a philosopher laugh at a garter† or a ribbon, if they become ties of obligation upon the wearer.—He may think the constitution of France has breeched itself into manhood, by rejecting the toys of its infancy; to me there appears more of the presumptuous imbecility of dotage, which throws away its crutch in an impotent spasm of imaginary vigour, and totters unsupported to that grave, which yawns to receive it.—He may stalk with a savage delight through the ruins of an abased nobility, and erect trophies to re-

* Rights of Man, Page 32.

† Ibid.

publicanism on their site.—My heart is too old-fashioned for these raptures ; to my eyes the disfigured arms of the pride of Montmorenci, afford a melancholy spectacle.—I see disgrace in the act, and ruin in the consequence.—France will have no more Montmorenci's.

But I forget myself, I am answering Mr. Paine, and I speak of feeling ; a republican champion must be attacked in some more vulnerable quarter : there he is armed at all points, and like old Hamlet's Ghost,

Dead corse——(In complete steel.)

But is the inheritance of honours, that monster frightful to *reason*, and irreconcilable to *sense*?—Let us case-harden our hearts as much as we can ; let us shut them against the dangerous intrusion of a single feeling, and abstract our ideas into the seventh heaven of matter of fact, and I do not think the absurdity of hereditary dignities can be proved.—What is the foundation of the common principle of inheritance in general?—Inheritance of property is liable to every objection, which is made to inheritance of honour.—Large properties must originally have been acquired by merit or industry, but that is no reason they should descend to those who may possess neither ; hereditary merit or industry is not less absurd than an hereditary judge or legislator : the reason why my ancestor many hundred years ago obtained a certain tract of country,

try, is not better known at this day than the reason why the ancestor of a nobleman obtained at the same time a peerage: the most we can do is to suppose it was for some desert. But if we were put upon our present titles I plead inheritance, and shall not the same plea be allowed to him? shall the hoard of the miser and the spoil of the oppressor descend in peaceable regularity to a worthless posterity, accumulating value in the ratio of its prostitution; and shall honour alone, that dearest of possessions, for which its votary will toil, and bleed, and die, expire like a withered leaf upon the parent stock, nor form a foliage to adorn his grave? But Mr. Paine may say, why should property descend?—Reform the grievance;—I shall decline this subject, till the objection is authorized by some example. Neither the National Assembly of France, nor the Republic of America, have yet adopted this scheme of reformation.

When the institution and inheritance of honour are considered even on the most abstract first principles, their origin is discoverable in wisdom; where objections on the same principles are examined they will be found to proceed from romantic ideas of human nature, which leave out of the complex character of man his feelings, his virtues and his vices, and suppose him a monster of cold unimpassioned perfection, actuated solely, and always by reason. This false estimate of human nature is the parent absurdity, from which all the visionary theories on this and other subjects are descended,

scended, they will even in theory prove too much, and if ever attempted to be reduced to practice their operation will always be resisted by nature.

There is not then in peerage itself any thing which calls upon England to follow the example of all France by abolishing it ; nor is there any thing which does so in the present state of peerage in England : if into it as into all other excellent institutions abuses have crept, they call for remedy, not for dissolution. The peerage of France wanted reform because it was not select ; the assumption of a title was almost arbitrary, and was frequently disgraced by the persons who assumed it : but even this was not a case so desperate as to require the extinction of the order, and the real old nobility of France received little redress for the abuse of their dignities by being involved in a common ruin with the usurpers : But how does this apply to England--is dignity promiscuous, titles arbitrary, and rank contemptible in England ? certainly not ; in England the inheritance of honour is ascertained with the same chaste attention to right, as inheritance of property. It is impossible for any man to pretend to an old title without the strictest regularity of descent, and the creation of new titles is wisely entrusted to the crown alone : by this means the chief magistrate is enabled to reward the performers of eminent services to the state, by advancing them to its first honours, and that order of merit cannot be very offensive in any country which is always within the attainment of talents and exertion :

ertion: besides by ascertained and well constituted gradation of rank, the limits of ambition are pointed out: it cannot become dangerous, because its utmost gratification is defined, and talents and industry will not be discouraged by being suspected and invidious. In the levelling malignity of a Republican government, in which distinction is not legalized, the exercise of virtue is dangerous, and ambition to serve the state is checked by the dread of an ungrateful return from a faithless and envious people. The reason given by a wretch who voted for the Ostracism of Aristides was, *he could not bear that any one should be called the just*; this can never be the case in a well regulated constitution, where rank is defined, titles graduated, and the creation of honours entrusted to an individual. Men who have fought the battles, directed the councils, explored the laws, and administered the justice of Britain, find their labours rewarded by a participation in the dignities of those whose ancestors obtained the same dignities by the same desert; the ennobled names of *Hawke, Amberst, Chatham and Mansfield*, inspire new ardour, valour and perseverance in the breasts of the soldier, the statesman and the lawyer. To win, and wear, and transmit to the children of his love, these proud distinctions, fires the emulation and repays the toils of each; a wise and well constituted country reaps the benefits of their ambition, and grudges not its remuneration. This order pledged to the interests of that country in which they enjoy wealth, rank and honor, form a ¹³²national and useful part of the legis-

lative body :—legislative power may well be entrusted to those whose dearest interests are involved in the prosperity of the country ; nor is any danger to be apprehended from their becoming an oligarcy, checked as they are on the one hand by the king, and on the other by the representatives of the people. This order also constitutes a dernier court of judicature, and the subject finds in a body, who have every human inducement to integrity, animated and corroborated by the strong and noble incitements of honour, a resort from the law's austerity and forensick ambiguity. The elegant gradations of the English constitution in matters of judicature, from justice to equity, and from equity to honour, form a system of jurisprudence, to the beauty and wisdom of which none can be insensible, except men (to use a strong expression of Mr. Burke's) who unite cold hearts to muddy understandings. Mr. Paine may discover much ridicule in the notion of an hereditary judge, but I appeal from his ridicule to experience, I appeal to all history, has from its earliest institution the judicial integrity of the English house of peers been once questioned? in repeated trials, did even suspicion impeach the chastity of their decisions? That frailty and corruption to which all men and all bodies are subject, has visited the other courts of justice, and in some disgraceful instances, the purity of the judicial ermine has been sullied, but the robes of the nobility of England have never yet blushed at the imputation. I have given a short and faint account of what I conceive to be the institution of
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the peerage in England; I cannot discover in it the *foppery of the human character, the baby clothes of political infancy* and the *punyism of senseless words*.*

I shall not consider myself fairly answered by any person who pleads instances of abuse in the peerage, except he can shew, that these abuses are incapable of reform, and call for a total extermination of the peerage itself. That there may have been instances in the country in which I now write, I will not deny; but the men who have taken them up most violently, have never proposed the example of France as the means of redress. When a minister abuses the ear of his master, and prostitutes the honours of his gift; when he makes dignities venal, and reduces the character of the peerage from being an order of honour, to an order of money, when this money the price of abused honour, is applied to the purposes of bribing the representative, and in the thirst of political œconomy, is turned a second time with an equal profit of corruption,—received for a dignity, and expended on a conscience;—then will the voice of the country be raised, and it will be heard; the guilty broker in this criminal traffick, may evade justice and enquiry for a time, but the outraged genius of the constitution, will vindicate its dignity, and must prevail. When grievances such as these exist, the country calls for retribution and example; but not for the eversion of that dignity, for which it shews

* Rights of Man, Page 32.

its regard, by resenting the abuse of it. The offender who prostitutes the royal privilege, should be brought before the bar of his country; and he who poisons the fountain of honour in its source, should drink at the fountain of justice to the dregs. This is constitutional remonstrance, and constitutional vengeance; they differ much from popular convulsion and indiscriminate abolition; they are the sentiments of a Whig, but not a Whig of the Capital.

It would be difficult to reduce into a catalogue Mr. Paine's dispersed invectives against those blemishes in the English constitution, which call upon the country to adopt the example of France. His most violent rhapsodies are directed against the existence of monarchy and peerage, two thirds of that constitution which he assumes to reform: I have endeavoured to answer him on these subjects—his declamation against church establishments next claims my attention; I shall in the few words I mean to offer on this topic, avoid every reference to religious controversy. Whether Mr. Paine considers the Bible as divine or historical, or both, or neither; Whether he believes St. Paul to have been an inspired writer and an apostle, or only quotes him as a *certain author of some antiquity*. * He will, I hope, admit that religion is necessary; if he does not, but supposes that human reason which he thinks may be entrusted with the full

* Rights of Man, page 30.

exercise of natural rights, is also competent to the practice of morality and the cares of futurity, it is useless to debate the question; however, I will suppose him as a statesman, admitting just so much of human fallibility, as that a system of moral and religious duties is necessary to guide and enlighten the people of a country, and that an order of men should be appointed and authorized, for the purposes of extending and enforcing its doctrine. This is the origin of the body of the clergy in every country:—that these purposes may be carried into effective execution is the cause of this order being incorporated with the state; because it is found that sanctity of profession alone is insufficient to procure the reverence of mankind, and requires the addition of temporal authority and respectability; on this principle the stipends of these men become the care of the government and their revenues are protected by the laws of the land, because their subsistence would be precarious, if entrusted to the casual contributions of mankind, and morality would be endangered if the pastors were dependent on their flocks. As society consists of a variety of ranks, it is an object with a wise government, that no rank should be deprived of the servants of religion, and that the clergy should have in the prospect of advancement, an incitement to emulation and an encouragement to excel in the discharge of their duties. In these considerations is discovered one necessity for the variety of clerical ranks, and in the nature of every body of men which requires internal discipline and subordination

dination is discovered another: but the institution of bishops and their dignity in the state is particularly offensive to Mr. Paine, who seems to think that a description of men should be particularly disqualified for the honours and service of their country, because their education is liberal and literary, their office sacred, and their obligations to integrity of a more solemn nature than those which bind the remainder of mankind.

Church establishment, which Mr. Paine calls a *mule animal*, appears to me to be founded on these principles, and in being so, I do not conceive it to be one of the things which call upon us to follow the example of France, if the example of France tended to its abolition, which it does not; on the contrary these principles seemed to have their due weight with the National Assembly, and so far from divorcing the church from the state, the clergy are eligible to seats in that very assembly, and at this moment form no inconsiderable part of it; I find also that the politicians of France do not consider the inequality of church property a grievance or a *monster*, because Mr. Paine's own account is this, that no clergyman in France, by the new constitution, has more than three thousand pounds a year and none less than fifty pounds, there cannot be a much greater disproportion of reward for the same services than this, and the equalizers of France would never have consented to it, if they did not think it necessary. In England there are but three or four instances of a bishopric exceeding
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three thousand pounds a year, some are not so much, and there are very few curates at present under fifty pounds a year: but as I am not sufficiently exercised in the writing of pamphlets, to push my opinions to unfair lengths, or suppress what is exceptionable in any institution I defend—I am free to confess that the small and miserable pittance of fifty pounds a year to any minister of religion, appears to me to be disgraceful to the country, injurious to the promotion of morality and virtue, and to call loudly for redress. The present collection of tythes also is, to use Mr. Paine's words, a source of perpetual discontent between the tithe holder and the parishioner; I am far however from considering its abolition necessary, but for the interest and honour of both parties, some modification of its present form, especially in this kingdom of Ireland, is indispensibly requisite. The clergy have not a more warm friend to their order, nor a more zealous well wisher to its dignity and respectability than I am, but certainly it is not to their honour, and I am sure not to their interest, to be impracticable on this subject, and that *esprit de corps* which agitates them to irritation, when the hem of their garment is touched, (though it be to mend it) is illiberal and injurious. The church in France has been plundered, not reformed; and even if Mr. Paine is of opinion that the measures taken in France were necessitated by the degraded and degenerate state of the French clergy, yet in order to make it a foundation for calling upon England to adopt the example

example of France, he must shew that the English clergy are in an equal state of degeneracy, and that church property in England * “ consists of the
 “ bequests of devotees, and penitent debauchees,
 “ bequeathed in trust to the priesthood for pious
 “ uses, and kept by the priesthood for themselves.”

From Mr. Paine's violence on the subject of intolerance, a foreigner would suppose, that the church of England persecuted with a bigotted zeal all dissenters from its tenets; this is the reverse of the fact. The penal laws on our statute books have not their origin, as Mr. Paine states †, in a presumptuous interference between the creature and the Creator, and a dictation to God, in what manner he is to receive the worship of man.—The penal laws have a very different foundation. When these countries were violently distracted by contending political parties, the name of religion became prostituted to the purposes of faction; different professions of faith were other names for different interests, and as a party could not give their cause any colour more plausible or animating than religion, the zeal of the many, became instrumental to the ambition of the few: thus by a criminal fiction was a divine grafted upon a human quarrel, and the honour of Heaven was pretended to be engaged in the dissensions of men.—In this manner the various persuasions in regard to religion, blended and assimilated their tenets with their

* Page 66.

† Page 35 & 36.

respective distinctions in the state.—Popery was the creed of the advocates of arbitrary power, and the levellers and republicans interpreted Christianity by Presbyterianism.—When with difficulty, and after many and severe contests among the different sects, the peace of the country was at last restored, the laws which it was necessary to enact for its continuance, naturally breathed a spirit of exclusion against its late disturbers ; and as religion had been their pretext, those laws had a necessary relation to their different professions of faith. This was the real foundation of the penal laws, and what makes it appear to have been so, is, that in-proportion as the political influence and danger to be apprehended from these parties has declined, the severity of the penal laws has relaxed, both in their enforcement and continuance.—The effects have abated as the causes have vanished ; the experience of a few years in England and Ireland, proves the truth of this statement, and if it is asked why the laws are not totally repealed ? I answer that their causes have not *totally* ceased to exist ; this is an invidious and unpleasant subject, and one I should wish not to agitate—I shall only say, as Mr. Paine's strictures on the penal laws of England have compelled me to undertake it, that his own pamphlet and the dissemination of it, through the north of Ireland in particular, are perhaps not the least existing evidences that republicanism and presbyterianism have not yet dissolved their ancient connection. The penal laws against Roman Catholics in Ireland, though considerably softened both in num-

ber and execution, originated in other causes.—

A natural attachment which this body was supposed to feel for a family pretending to the throne which was of their own persuasion, and would have established their religion, was one cause, which though it now does not exist, was formerly far from being ideal ; besides at the conclusion of the troublesome times, the greatest part of property in the country, underwent a revolution, and the unstable tenure of forfeitures became indebted to severity for confirmation—it was not unnatural to suspect men of disaffection to a government which had proscribed their fathers and plundered their inheritance, and the law looked with a jealous eye upon those who were reduced to till that ground which their ancestors had possessed.

—This was the natural consequence of the termination of a contest, and if the Roman Catholic interest had prevailed, it must have been preserved by similar precautions ; but time has worn out much of the cause, and I hope in a little more time a vestige of the effect will not be discoverable. Mr. Paine loves not toleration more than I do, nor more earnestly wishes for its extension, but as the cessation of the causes of its restriction must be progressive, its establishment cannot be abrupt. The ancient wounds of the country are almost healed, the necessity of violent and corrosive applications exists no longer ; its final recovery must be effected by lenients, but its convalescence should not be endangered by a premature and convulsive exertion ;—I trust for the extinction of intolerance

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to the illumination of the human mind and the wisdom of the country, but should be sorry to see it effected by the adoption of the example of France. Every thing desirable on this subject is to be expected from temper and patience, but nothing is so likely to retard its accomplishment as an inflammatory appeal to the passions of mankind on so irritable a topic : the consequence of such an appeal must be to agitate a few troublesome and discontented spirits, and thereby bring suspicion upon the whole body of different dissenters from the church of England, of whom I am convinced a large majority are respectable citizens and good subjects. To make this appeal required little candour, when the consequences which Mr. Paine would wish to deduce, are so little to be justified in reasoning ; he proposes as examples to England and Ireland, where causes for penal statutes have existed, the examples of France and America where such causes do not exist : but the motives of this sophistry are very discoverable, and I trust it will be as ineffectual as it is fallacious.

The author of the Rights of Man attacks another part of the constitution of England, the royal prerogative of declaring peace or war ; he recommends in this also the example of France, which has transferred this right from the crown to the National Assembly : I shall offer the few reasons which induce me to think this matter better managed in England than in France. For the purposes of making successful war or honourable peace,

secrecy and expedition are absolutely necessary, and these are more to be expected from one, than if intrusted to the multiplicity and publicity of opinions given in an assembly,—all history ancient and modern confirm this. Philip subdued the republics of Greece, because he within himself contained the soul which actuated his armies: he was secret, vigilant, rapid and successful; the states wasted away in painful consumption under his attacks, from the corruption, mutability and publicity of their councils, and the consequent lethargic execution of their resolves. Demosthenes, a great and powerful advocate for liberty, laments this vice of their republican form, and attributes to it their defeat;—perhaps in a few years (if for a few years the constitution of France can exist) France herself may offer a strong and ready argument in support of this opinion; when the National Assembly deliberate upon the question of war, there will be found some difference between the lazy votes and published dissensions of a motley multitude, and the active energies of enterprize, conceived by a great king or an able minister, and executed with secrecy and celerity.—Brest may be blockaded, and Paris besieged, before the National Assembly shall have decided on the propriety of firing a single shot. The expediency of a war may be one of those questions on which much may be said on both sides. War will not wait for the tedious eloquence of a debate, and the possibility of choice may be prevented by an enemy, before a choice is determined on; besides, supposing this
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political infant the National Assembly conceived in perfection, by some peculiar grace, never to know sin or taste of corruption, yet with every allowance of purity of intention, there may be on such a question a division of opinions, in which case the very first principle that those who pay the expences of the war should declare it, will be defeated ; imagine the possible case of a question of war in the National Assembly which consists, suppose, of one thousand members, in which five hundred and one should vote for war, and four hundred and ninety-nine for peace, war would of course be determined on, and the half of the people of France, that is about twelve million and a half of men, less by the constituents of one representative, would be charged with the expences of a war, to which on the principles of representation they had not consented ; or the case might occur of an equality of votes, in which instance it is supposed the president decides by a casting voice ; if his voice is for war, all France would fight the quarrel of half of it, and on the principle of every man defending his natural rights of opinion, a second war would be carried on at home, by one half of France against the other. This is enough to shew that Mr. Paine's first principle is not decisive. But perhaps France may suffer from this change in her constitution a less imaginary evil ; the National Assembly as I am informed is composed of men, and I do not find that Heaven has bestowed on them a patent of perfection in exclusion to the rest of the species ; it is therefore possible that they may be
corrupted ;

corrupted ; it may happen when a question of war is before them, in which the honour of the country is essentially involved, when the balance of debate trembles, that foreign gold artfully introduced into the Assembly will turn the scale, and the real glory and interests of the nation be sacrificed to its ideal freedom ; this is more than possible, it is probable, it has happened in all republican governments where the right of peace and war has resided in the senate, and is doubly to be expected in the fugacious representation of France, where every senator dies every two years to legislation and responsibility, and according to a humorous comparison of Mr. Burke, like a chimney sweeper, as soon as he has learned his trade, becomes incapacitated for its exercise. And is this an apprehension for France, the proof of which is reserved for futurity ? On the expected rupture between England and Spain, when the question of the family compact was agitated in the National Assembly, there were some strong suspicions of its reality. The wealth of the deceased *Mirabeau* was not solely acquired by the brokerage of assignats—*Cassius was himself supposed to have an itching palm* ;—but he is no more—and though his ashes have usurped an urn among the monuments of the great, the memory of his real character requires no contribution from my hand. It may be said that the same possibility of corruption exists, when this right resides in the crown, or according to Mr. Paine, in a metaphor—it does not, because the principle of action in this case in a senate is interest,

interest, and when a man is corrupted, his opinions of public interest will bend to his private interest. —The principle of conduct in a king is honour, and the situation of a king places him above the necessity of a private interest, incompatible with honour. History records no instance of a republic, into the councils of which corruption has not found its way, and by the weight of foreign influence, decided upon foreign politics. *Urbem venalem et cito perituram si emptorem inveneris*, is the character of the Roman Commonwealth, left us by Jugurtha, and no one was better qualified to pronounce upon its venality.—There is but one instance of a profligate and prodigal king who sold the honour of his crown.

For these reasons I cannot think that the king of England's prerogative of declaring peace or war, checked by the power of the parliament to refuse the supplies for its prosecution, is a dangerous circumstance in the English constitution, which calls upon the people to adopt the example of France. —We entrust the sword to the royal arm; but the sinews of that arm, branch from the body of the people.

The English constitution has long been the happiness of the people, and the admiration of strangers: but it is now discovered by Mr. Paine, that England has no constitution.—He says, the very debates about what is the constitution, prove that there is none, and that the people ought to cashier the
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the present government, and make one to which at any time, reference may be had.—That the debates about what is the constitution proves there is none, is another of those flippant and plausible assertions, which at first sight appears unanswerable ; but this statement like Mr. Paine's argument against monarchy will prove too much, and of course nothing.—If nothing exists of the nature of which there are doubts entertained, there are very few existences.—This process of reasoning, would infer that there was no law in England, and the debates among lawyers of what the law is, would prove it.—It is a mode of argument equally commodious to the rebel, the highwayman, and the infidel, it will even conclude that there is no God ; and the controversies in Divinity, respecting the attributes of the Supreme Being, will demonstrate the problem.—This defect in Mr. Paine's statement would justify me in dismissing it as refuted ; but let us consider it more minutely.

Perhaps nothing more contributes to the freedom of England, than this constant principle of action and reaction in the political machine.—The different powers constantly exerting their respective influences, counteract and prevent the preponderancy of any, while the energies of all are preserved by the very opposition which puts them into motion.—In such a construction, when any thing goes wrong, a little thing will set it right.—In a constitution on Mr. Paine's plan, the abuses to which from the fluctuation of things, and the passions

sions of men it is subject, will find in the structure itself no principle of remedy—no seeming discord in the component parts, producing the harmony of the whole; but without any resource in the operation of internal exertion, at the touch of an abuse it will be irrecoverably infected, and waste away progressively to its total consumption, except the decay of the fabric is anticipated by the violent and only remedy of pulling it down.—The sentiments of a good subject in England, consist in an equal apprehension from the dangers of influence in the crown, and licentiousness in the people.—The division of this apprehension, constitutes the two opposite parties of Whig and Tory.—The conflict between these principles carried on, (in the end with equal) and mostly alternate success, occasions a fluctuating preponderancy of the influences of both, the result of which produces the just prerogatives of the crown, and the political freedom of the people. Mr. Paine plausibly states that in the English government there is no responsibility, because influence has defeated it.—I admit, that if ever any minister obtains an influence, which will enable him to do any thing, and then acquit him when impeached, there will be no responsibility.—But this theory which Mr. Paine fastens upon the nature of mixed governments, is refuted by the *experience* of ours.—There exists not, nor I believe ever can exist in England, so dangerous a quantity of influence as this.—A late House of Commons voted, that “*The influence of the crown had encreased, is encreasing, and ought to be*
K “*diminished,*”

“ *diminished*,” and by the very act of voting it, proved the falsity of the proposition.—It was a resolution which might be true the moment before it was carried, but involved its negative in its affirmation.—The influence of the crown could not have been dangerously great in parliament, when parliament declared it to be so ; and whenever the question of the constitution is fairly put to parliament, it will always be decided according to its spirit.—Mr. Pitt, who is a very high-handed minister, and has a great majority in parliament, was lately obliged to relinquish the shop tax, though he could have carried it by votes, and there is a responsibility from every minister to the opinions of the people, which no minister can defy.—I admit, whenever influence destroys responsibility, Mr. Paine’s theory will be just ; because it will be reduced to practice ; ’till then I do not admit it.—In Ireland where influence is greater, and responsibility less than in England, no minister has ever been able to resist the *ascertained* voice of the people. When the real interest of the country is brought forward, all the powers of influence are suspended. Every stretch of power, every engine of corruption was in vain exerted, to carry the infamous propositions in the year one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven. A daring administration, and a government fond of strong measures, in vain laboured to push them ; but the voice and the interest of the country were against them, and the minister struck to a minority.—When in one thousand seven hundred and eighty-two,

two, Ireland called for independence and emancipation, all the influence of the corruptest government would have been unable to silence the thunder of the national cry. Government felt its responsibility, (as it always must on every great question) and met the wishes of the people; there were not wanting jealous-minded, and short-sighted men in England, who thought the advancement of one sister incompatible with the prosperity of the other; but the wishes of a great kingdom were ascertained, and to resist them was impossible. Then the voice of the people murmured not in clubs, nor clamoured in assemblies; it was heard in the sober language of parliamentary remonstrance. Eloquence and patriotism united their choicest attributes in one man, to render him the organ of a nation's rights; they kindled in his bosom, and burned on his lips; *a listening senate hung on all he spoke*, caught the sacred flame, partook in the glorious work, and the constitution of Ireland was reformed by itself*. But Mr. Paine conceives

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* I shall here observe, that I have not supposed throughout this book, the possibility of a separate interest between England and Ireland.—In speaking of the constitution of England, I wish to be considered as addressing myself also to the inhabitants of Ireland.—There are some few and very few people in this kingdom, who entertain an opinion that a dismemberment of the connection with England would be useful: the opinion is dangerously unfounded; but if there is any attempt meditated against the English constitution, if the republican principles of the Revolution Society, or any other Society, are ever attempted to be carried into

it to be a paradox, that a vitiated body can reform itself, and that therefore the desired reform in England, must proceed from the interference of the people at large. Without reminding Mr. Paine that every vitiation of the English representation, to which subject he applies this maxim, is ultimately reducible to the people who are the electors, and that the corruption will not be destroyed by extending it, I shall combat the assertion in a more general sense.—Every single act of parliament, every amendment of an act of parliament, is in fact part of a progressive system of reformation of those abuses which have crept into our, as they must into all governments.—A doctrine violently hostile to the liberty of the subject, was lately forced by men of arbitrary principles, into the courts of jus-

into execution, there may be some policy in commencing the attack in this country, and the Whigs of the Capital may prove themselves not bad pioneers, in having by the dissemination of Mr. Paine's pamphlet, *effrayee le chemin*.

If in any appeal to the prosperity of England against Mr. Paine's calumnies, I have been at all successful, I wish to be considered as doubly conclusive in the case of Ireland, which is one of the most rising and flourishing countries in Europe.—I shall give here but one reason for thinking so:—*Molineaux*, whose name is consecrated by Irishmen, as the champion of their liberty, and friend to their interests,—in his Case of Ireland, published about a century ago, speaks of an union with England as a blessing, which Ireland in her most sanguine moments should never expect to enjoy.—An Irish patriot, a hundred years ago, considered as a circumstance too happy to be hoped for—an event of which every Irish patriot of this day deprecates the idea.

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tice, I mean the late doctrine of libels.—That evil was not redressed, that vitiation was not reformed by a French interference of the people: the question was the other day brought forward, not in a Congress, not in a self-formed National Assembly, not under the apprehensions of a mob; but temperately in the senate of the nation, assembled in all the disgraceful antiquity of prescriptive form, and the opposition and the minister, and all parties joined in the reprobation and redress of the grievance. This is one of the many instances, which prove that the legislature of the country is competent to the reformation of abuses, and nothing can be conceived more deplorable than a form of constitution so fragile as to possess in itself no principle of resistance against casual violence or impairing time, but at every assault of either to fall in pieces, and require like a child's edifice of cards, to be built up again.—The English constitution contains within itself, the resources of its conservation, and in the very moment of its apparent decay, feeds the regeneration of its vigour: —It stands over the waves of time in grandeur and beauty, and strength, like the famed arch of fine design, which seems to yield to the smallest weight.—A half informed observer, trembles because it shakes; ignorant that the very concussion is the proof of its stability.

I have now finished my remarks on Mr. Paine's pamphlet, and what I have endeavoured to prove is:

First,

First, *That the natural rights which he calls upon the people of England to exercise, in adoption of the example of France, are not possessed by the people.*

Secondly, *That the political right of the people to reform their government is not a right in existence, but in contingency upon the necessity of such reform.*

And thirdly, *That such necessity exists not in England, and that the English constitution has been mistated by Mr. Paine.*

If I have at all succeeded in the proof of these propositions, it will follow that Mr. Paine's metaphysics and politics are equally false.—A strong conviction of the wicked intention, and dangerous tendency of his book, and a warm attachment to the constitution of my country, have induced me to offer these sentiments to the public.—Loyal and constitutional, they require little ornament of language, if I were able to give it to them;—my wish is in plain words to defend what is right, and expose what is wrong;—not a pretender to stile, I have forborn any criticisms upon Mr. Paine's; a forbearance, for which, though he may have the same cause, I have not his example. † But there
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† Rights of Man. The unbought grace of life, (if any one knows what that is) &c. &c.

It could not be expected, that a beautiful passage in perhaps the finest composition of the finest writer; a passage which not

is something more than commonly alarming, which will justify the presumption of writing, when the example of a distracted country is plausibly proposed to a prosperous and free people. The constitutions of France and America may possibly turn out very well; but the oldest of them has not yet stood the test of ten years, and the other scarcely as many months old, still struggles in the convulsions of infancy;—he must have more faith in prophecy than in experience, who wishes to adopt either of them in exchange of a system, the excellence of which experiment has confirmed, and ages have ratified.—Any man who has studied the merits, and enjoys the blessings of the English constitution, cannot but be alarmed when the legislators of France (*those babes and sucklings in politics*) are held up in their cradle, to the imitation of a country whose government adds the strength of maturity to the venerable aspect of

to understand, is not to feel, should escape the criticism of the author of the following sentence:—

The graceful pride of truth, knows no extremes, but preserves in every latitude of life, the right-angled character of man.

RIGHTS OF MAN.

The right-angled character of man, if any one knows what that is—

The only interpretation of a *right-angled character*, I have heard is that discovered by an ingenious gentleman, that it is a *mixture of upright and base*.—How far this eulogium on republican excellence is improved by explication, let those who emulate this character, decide.

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age ; a government, which I trust will not be exchanged for a certain tumult in the first instance, and a doubtful reform in the second.—I love liberty as much as Mr. Paine, but differ from him in my opinion of what it is ;—I pant not for the range of a desert, unbounded, and barren and savage ; but prefer the limited enjoyments of cultivation, whose confines, while they restrain, protect me, and add to the quality more than they deduct from the quantity of my freedom ;—this I feel to be my birthright, as a subject of Great Britain, and cannot but tremble for my happiness, when a projector recommends, to level the wise and ancient land marks, break down the fences, and disfigure the face of my inheritance— I have no wish to return to the desert in search of my natural rights, I consider myself as having exchanged them for the better, and am determined to stand by the bargain.

These sentiments, my dear Sir, have tempted me to trouble you and the public with this book ; the times are critical and the feeblest exertion cannot be unwelcome, when a factory of sedition is set up in the metropolis, and an upstart Club sends an inflammatory pamphlet through the kingdom. —When these state quacks infecting their country at the heart, circulate, by fomenting applications, the poison to the extremities, and reduce the price of the pestilence, least the poverty of any creature should protect him from its contagion.

gion.——The times are critical when such a book as Mr. Paine's appears, and the consequences would be fatal, if its success was proportioned to the zeal of its author, or the industry of its propagators.——It is a system of false metaphysics, and bad politics——any attempt to carry it into effect, must be destructive of peace, and there is nothing practical in it, but its mischief.—It holds out inducements to disturbance, on the promise of improvement, and softens the prospect of immediate disorder in the cant of the empiric, *you must be worse before you can be better.*—It excites men to what they *ought not to do*, by informing them of what they *can do*, and preaches *rights** to promote *wrongs*. It is a collection of unamiable speculations, equally subversive of good government and good thinking;—it establishes a kind of republic in the mind; dethrones the majesty of sentiment; degrades the dignity of noble and elevated feelings,

* There was a popular weapon sold throughout France, at the time of the Revolution, for less than three livres.—This instrument too was called the Rights of Man, (*droits d'homme*) was sold at a reduced price, and contained within itself every principle of human annoyance.—It was something like a loaded whip, of about five feet in length, and concealed a cut-and-thrust sword.

By this contrivance every man was enabled to purchase for a few sous, a thing which armed him with power to knock down, cut; and stab his fellow creatures, as he pleased.—*It was long, heavy, pointed, sharp, and cheap.*

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and substitutes a democracy of mean and vulgar calculations.—In their usurpation all the grace, and elegance, and order of the human heart is overturned and the state of man,

“ Like to a little kingdom, suffers
“ The nature of an insurrection.—

I have the honour to be,

MY DEAR SIR,

Yours, &c. &c.

DUBLIN,
June 15th, 1791.

F I N I S.

